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ABSTRACT
The Annapurna Mahila Mandal , a grassroots, working-class women's
organization in Bombay, India has developed over ten years into an
effective agent for change for over 5,000 home-based caterers, the
Annapurnas. It has gained recognition and status for the work its
members perform, has acted as an intermediary between banks and its
members to get them access to low-interest loans, and has provided
them health care, legal, and social services. Through AMM Annapurnas
have managed to stabilize their businesses, increase their bargaining
power, and lessen their vulnerability to both domestic and business
problems.
The focus of this papar is two-pronged in its attempt to estimate
the extent of change AMM projects can effect in its members' lives.
One focus is on the nature of the caterers' work and their role in the
economy. A review of radical and liberal theories about the nature of
the informal and formal sectors provides the framework for analysis.
The other focus is on the nature of AMM projects and the benefits
members have experienced thanks to them. An understanding of the role
the caterers play in the economy offers one explanation of why AMM's
successes lie in changes in social relationships as much as in its
efforts to expand employment opportunities for its members. This
analysis seeks an explanation as much in the nature of the economy in
which the Annapurnas function as in the nature of the AMM
organization.
The case raises questions about definitions of development, the
relative importance of increased earnings, and the choice of
activities policy makers might pursue in assisting poor people in
developing countries. A review of the changes AMM has effected in the
lives of its members and an analysis of factors influencing the
strengths and lim-itations this indigenous organization faces may shed
some light on just what results we can expect from efforts to improve
the income of poor self-employed people in developing countries.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
As a grassroots, working-class women's organization, the
Annapurna Mahila Mandal of Bombay, India could be the envy of any
agency involved in Third World development. The Annapurna Mahila
Mandal (AMM) has grown from fourteen original members to an enormous
active membership of over 5,000 in a decade. It has gained
recognition and status for the work its members, all home-based
caterers (cal led Annapurnas) perform, has acted as an intermediary
between banks and its members to get them access to low-interest
loans, and has provided health care, legal, and social services to
them. Through AMM Annapurnas have managed to stablize their
businesses, increase their bargaining power, and lessen their
vulnerability to both domestic and business problems.
The business-related efforts AMM has undertaken closely resemble
those which various private voluntary organizations based in the
United States and in countries all over the Third World have
initiated, often with support from major funding agencies like the
Inter-American Development Bank and the United States Agency for
International Development. A review of the changes AMM has effected
in the lives of its members and an analysis of factors influencing the
strengths and limitations this indigenous organization faces may shed
some light on just what results we can expect from efforts to improve
the income of poor self-employed people in developing countries.
The focus of this paper will be two-pronged in its attempt to
estimate the extent of change AMM projects can effect in its members'
lives. One focus will be on the nature of the caterers' work and
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their role in the economy. A review of radical and liberal theories
about the nature of the informal and formal sectors** will provide the
framework for analysis. The other focus will be on the nature of AMM
projects and the benefits members have experienced thanks to them. An
understanding of the role the caterers play in the economy offers one
explanation of why AMM's successes lie in changes in social
relationships as much as in economic gains and why the organization
has had only limited success in its efforts to expand employment
opportunities for its members. This analysis seeks an explanation
more in the nature of the economy in which the Annapurnas function
than in the nature of the AMM organization, though this is also
important to some extent.
This paper suffers the disadvantage of relying on secondary data
since I have not visited the organization and its members myself. As
a result there are sometimes contradictions and variations in the data
that I cannot resolve. In response, I have settled on the figure most
frequently cited or one in the middle range while still reporting the
two extremes. An organization as old, successful, and well known as
the Annapurna Mahila Mandal often develops a kind of mythology about
**A note about the choice of vocabulary: certain words used to
describe people in different occupations and firms in developing
countries reflect specific theoretical views which imply various
interpretations of the nature of economies in those countries. The
use of "informal sector" and "formal sector" usually indicate a
liberal or neo-classical analytical framework while radical or neo-
Marxist theorists often refer to the same workers and firms in terms
of class or their role in the international economy. For the sake
of simplicity, I will use "informal sector" to refer to businesses
and workers which are not registered or enumerated by the State and
"formal sector" to those which are. This is not meant to imply that
there exist two separate and distinct sectors with no linkages
connecting them. For a more detailed description of the theoretical
debate of this issue, see Chapter III.
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it which can exaggerate certain of its important qualities. I have
relied on my own previous work on women and development in India, my
familiarity with AMM from my job, and information from several funders
involved with the organization to discern myth from reality. Because
the paper does not attempt an evaluation of the organization, but
rather uses a theoretical analysis of the members' work to understand
the capacity of organizations of its type to enhance income, the data
available seem adequate for the task.
The paper has five sections. Part I describes the socio-economic
status and work of the Annapurnas, along with the history and
accomplishments of the Annapurna Mahila Mandal. Part II contains an
analysis of the relationships between the Annapurnas and other actors,
their customers, suppliers, families, and each other, and how
participation in AMM has changed their interactions with them. Part
III provides an overview of radical and liberal theories of the
informal sector. It contains a theoretical analysis of the role of
the Annapurnas' work and places the project efforts of AMM in the
context of theoretical debate. Part IV discusses the rationality of
AMM's choice of direction and the limitations the organization faces
in light of the radical analysis of the nature of growth in the
informal sector. Part V concludes with thoughts about definitions of
development, the relative importance of increased earnings, and the
choice of activities policy makers might pursue in assisting poor
people in developing countries.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ANNAPURNA MAHILA MANDAL -- A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND
ITS MEMBERS
In Bombay thousands of women prepare and sell meal s in their
homes to migrant male textile workers who live in the city without
their families. The khannawallas, or "food givers" as the women are
called, are very poor and carry out their work under conditions that
are characteristic of many self-employed people in the informal
sector.
Khannawallas produce in their homes, which typically are rooms
six feet by six feet in the crowded areas of central Bombay, near the
textile mills. They work with no proper ventilation or lighting, and
water, sewerage, and trash service either do not exist or are
inadequate.1 They have to wait in line for water at taps long
distances from their home and carry it back for both business and
famil y use.
As is common in many smal 1 informal sector enterprises, the
distinction between inputs for the business and goods for household
consumption is blurred. 2  The khannawallas feed themselves and their
families from the food they prepare for their boarders, which makes it
difficult to calculate their actual income. But according to sample
budgets of some caterers prepared by the Annapurna Mahila Mandal, a
typical monthly net income in cash is Rs. 83.50.*3 This figure is
*Rs. 10.5 = U.S. $1.00 in 1984.4 The consumer price index for Bombay
in 1982 was Rs. 2,082 per month (1934 = 100).
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arrived at by subtracting expenditures on supplies from boarders'
payments.4 Another study reports the average net daily income to be
between Rs. 15 and Rs. 20, though the authors warn that the figures
should be treated as very rough estimates. 6  The discrepancy between
the figures may be due in part to some range in size of business or to
whether or not they include the value of the food from the catering
business that the family consumes, which has been estimated to be
between Rs. 400 to Rs. 500 per month. 7 Three hundred rupees has been
estimated elsewhere to be the income of an average size catering
busines s, and we wil1 use that as a mean.
Since the caterers often work from five in the morning until ten
at night to accomodate their boarders' work schedules and many time-
consuming tasks, the per hour remuneration for their labor is very
low, especially compared to the minimum average daily wage of Rs. 30-
45 for skilled workers in the state of Maharashtra. 8 Returns to labor
are even lower when one counts the work contributed by the women's
daughters and daughters-in-law, who work along with them. No fixed
rate of pay is recorded for these assistants; they probably receive
only shelter and food for contributing to household income. The
extremely long hours, lack of weekly holidays, and use of female
family labor reflect the blurring between business and home production
characteristic of informal sector business. The blurring may be
especially strong in this case because the job, meal production,
duplicates services usually provided in the home, outside of the
market economy.
Khannawal las are not, however, the most destitute of self-
employed workers in Bombay. According to a survey of khannawal las
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carried out in 1979, 50% of the sample had husbands with steady
employment, often in the textile industry (at least before the 1982
textile strike), and could depend on a second income for the family.9
After the strike, though, only 25%-30% had an additional wage-earner
in the family. 1 0 Fifty percent reported a monthly family income of
less than Rs. 500. The caterers' businesses also reportedly earn more
than those of other self-employed women who produce utensils or glass,
or who work as vendors, though the figures from this study confl ict
with the findings of another.' 1
Like many self-employed people in the informal sector,
khannawallas borrow from informal sector moneylenders or buy on credit
from their food suppliers. They have problems with cash flow because
they sometimes let their customers eat on credit, because money for
business often must be diverted to family expenses, and because they
earn so little that they have very little margin for savings. The
interest rate on loans from moneylenders reportedly runs between 120%
and 300% per year. The interest rates are so high that the caterers
have great difficulty getting out of debt because the money they repay
covers only the interest; the principal is thus never reduced.12
Caterers serve two meal s per day to between 15 and 50 boarders.
The men pay for their meals on a monthly basis, using either money or
government-issued ration cards. The monthly cost for meals in 1984
was recently Rs. 170 for those who paid cash and Rs. 160 for those
using ration cards. The caterers use these cards to purchase staples
at government ration stores, where prices are 25-50% lower than in
wholesale markets; retail prices are undoubtedly even higher.13
Until a strike against the textile industry in 1982, male textile
workers constituted a very reliable market for the caterers. The 1981
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census of Bombay shows only 773 women per 1,000 males; people involved
with the Annapurna Mahil a Mandal cite this as an indication of the
great number of males who migrate without their families from rural
areas to Bombay in search of work. 14  They come alone in part because
of the shortage and high cost of housing in the city.
It is these lone males who, because they have no family to cook
for them, board with the caterers. As Everett and Savara point out,
the caterers do not compete for customers with large businesses (even
"rupee hotels" prove too expensive for these workers), but rather with
the "domestic sector," that is, private families; khannawallas can not
attract as customers the men who have brought their families to
Bombay.15
The 1982 strike of 250,000 textile workers against the mills in
Bombay changed this steady market for the caterers' services, taking
away a great deal of their business.1 6  Common knowledge has it that
many of the workers who were without work during the strike returned
to their places of origin. Those who lost their jobs because their
mills closed for good during the strike or because they were
ostensibly unskilled to operate the new machinery installed in others
did the same or went to other cities in search of work. Because of
the strike, according to Everett and Savara, "it is likely that there
will be a permanent reduction in the size of the textile labour force,
pointing to decreased income earning opportunities for khannawallas in
the future."1 7 Though the caterers still have textile workers as
boarders, they are trying to find other markets for their skills to
replace the demand that has been lost.
The Annapurna Mahila Mandal came into being in 1975 to help the
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khannawallas address the difficulties they had faced in their work and
family lives for over two decades. It has proved to be a responsive
organization, continuing to help its members face new circumstances in
their lives as they arise. The very name of the organization reflects
the type of change in status and recognition it hoped to bring about
for the caterers. Annapurna, the Hindu goddess of food, replaced the
somewhat derogatory khannawalla as the name the caterers chose to be
cal led.1 8  The Annapurna Mahila Mandal (AMM) thus translates to
something roughly like the Caterers' Charitable Society.
Prema Purao, a long-time trade union organizer for the Communist
Party of India, established the organization when the caterers' role
in supporting the textile workers during a 1973 strike came to her
attention. The caterers fed the striking textile workers even though
they could not pay. The women went deeper into debt, pawning their
jewelry and cooking utensils to continue their business during this
period of non-payment. Purao said she "real ised that these women were
enabling the workers to continue their struggle" and wanted to
organize an effort in support of the Annapurnas. 19
Purao arranged for Annapurnas to have access to subsidized loans
from nationalized Indian banks under a government program called the
Differential Rate of Interest scheme, which lends to self-employed
entrepreneurs from the lower classes at an interest rate of 4% per
year, far lower than the 12.5% charged for regular business loans. 20
This is actually a negative interest rate, since the rate of inflation
in the first quarter of 1975 was 23%, and 10% in 1984.21 To qual ify,
monthly family income must be less than Rs. 3,000. Purao wanted the
Annapurnas to have an alternative to borrowing from moneylenders and
grocers at high interest and under coercive conditions. The new
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source of working capital would allow them to buy inputs more cheaply
and less often. Though the women would have been eligible to borrow
on their own, most were either unaware of the program or, more likely,
were reluctant to deal directly with the banks.
In 1975 Purao persuaded fourteen women to take out individual
loans on a co-guarantor basis. According to this system, group
members guarantee each other's loans as a substitute for more
traditional forms of collateral, which poor women generally lack.
From those fourteen women, AMM has grown to include anywhere from
5,000 to 8,000 members, 22 many of whom have borrowed and repaid loans
averaging Rs. 2,000 more than once. 2 3
AMM prides itsel f on being a working class women's organization.
Women can join AMM only if they take a loan, which, because of
eligibility requirements, effectively ensures that all members are
working class women. Members pay Rs. 3 to join AMM and Rs. 12
annually as administrative charges for a loan. The loan period is
twenty-four months, with payments made monthly at neighborhood AMM
Centers. Borrowers put Rs. 200 from the loan proceeds into a
compulsory savings scheme, which serves as an additional personal
guarantee in case of default.
The rate of default on loans is quite low at 10% and is lower
than that of other khannawallas who participated in the same DRI
program through another intermediary. Everett and Savara attribute
the better rate to the Annapurna Mahila Mandal's "holistic" approach
to dealing with the needs and problems of self-employed women. 24 The
high repayment rate is especially significant since they also note
that banks do not take legal action against defaulters because of the
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relatively small sums of money involved and because 90% of DRI loan
defaults are guaranteed by the Government of India. It is al so
reported that during the 1982 textile strike, banks granted
concessions to defaulters.
The Annapurna Mahila Mandal is structured to encourage the
greatest level of grassroots participation possible. The members run
the organization themselves, which founder Prema Purao says "gives
these women a sense of participation in this movement for positive
change in their lives."2 5  AMM consists of eighteen Centers in
different locations around Bombay where caterers live. Each Center
serves as the magnet for groups of borrowers in its area. Group
members elect representatives to a local committee for each Center and
also choose the sixty Annapurnas who make up the Executive Committee.
It is the local Committee which reviews applications for loans from
prospective new members in the Center's area. From the members of
the Executive Committee, fifteen are elected to serve as the officers
of the organization. They meet regularly to plan and implement new
programs which respond to the needs expressed by the members at large.
As part of its "hol istic" approach to facilitating change in the
Annapurnas' lives, AMM addresses problems of heal th, child care,
desertion by husbands, alcohol ism, and domestic violence. At its
Multi-Purpose Center, which has been operating since December 1983,
AMM provides access to legal services, has its own small shelter for
women in transition after leaving physical or mental abuse, a small
day-care center, a medical clinic, and library. Women also can
participate in vocational and literacy training. The scale of these
services has been limited though, and inadequate for 5,000 to 8,000
families. Provision of services has been made on an ad hoc basis, and
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no clear model has been established as yet for service delivery.26 A
welfare fund and an insurance scheme also provide some security for
emergencies.
AMM has also been trying to respond to changes which have
affected the Annapurnas' business, most notably the limited and
declining demand for their services by textile workers and the "credit
squeeze" which may resul t in the drying up of DRI 1oans. 2 7 Besides,
according to one funder, the organization realized that providing
access to credit could benefit the caterers only up to a point and
that other business needs had to be addressed to increase their
earning capacity and improve their qual ity of life.2 8  AMM has been
trying to do this by "upscal ing" the catering business, finding
alternative markets, and reducing the drudgery of the work by
introducing new technology.
AMM sought to accomplish this by establishing a kitchen
workshop/training center in its new Multi-Purpose Center in January,
1984. In training classes twenty caterers have learned to prepare
different products for their new, middle class customers and to
maintain a very uniform standard of quality. The Annapurnas work
collectively at the Center, producing snacks, lunches, pickles, and
catered meals for a mainly white-collar market, including employees of
the banks from whom AMM its members borrow.
The demand for the Annapurnas' new products has been sporadic
though. It is difficult to say whether this is because it takes time
to develop a market or whether other producers already satisfy demand.
Because orders are small and sporadic and because of limited space at
the production center, only about forty of the five to eight thousand
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AMM members have participated in caterers' training or food production
at the new Center. 2 9  Over the eight months between the beginning of
production and August, 1984, the collective efforts of twenty trainees
who work at the Multipurpose Center netted Rs. 9,550, with Rs. 45,878
in sal es. 3 0  This works out to approximately Rs. 60 per woman per
month, though each is paid between Rs. 250 and Rs. 325. One can
compare these earnings, though they are for part-time work, to Rs.
300, the medium-range estimate of earnings for full-time, home based
catering.
Planners on AMM's Executive Committee intended collective food
production based at the Multi-Purpose Center to reduce some of the
drudgery of the work involved, offer a better work environment, free
women from the isolation they experience working at home, and help
them produce quality goods for alternative markets. The equipment in
the kitchen, including grinders and a cooking range, does make for
less drudgery. But Srinavasan suspects that rather than lightening the
participating Annapurnas' work load, working at the Center may
increase it.31 Because demand, and therefore production, is only
sporadic, these Annapurnas must continue cooking for what boarders
they do have while they work at the Center. They cannot afford to
abandon their currrent, though possibly declining, market until the
new one stabilizes.
Donors to AMM have suggested that the current method of
production needs to be made more businessl ike if earnings are to be
raised. At present, when there is an order to be filled, more
Annapurnas than necessary show up to work on it and all want to
participate whether that is more productive or not. Srinavasan
believes that the AMM food service must run less like a social service
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agency, which emphasizes "self-confidence" and "solidarity," and more
like a business, which emphasizes efficiency and where only the
optimal number of people are allowed to be involved in production. 3 2
This approach would no doubt be more efficient and provide higher
earnings for those who participate, but it also has implications for
the number of women who can benefit from the AMM food service
component.
All the same, AMM proudly points out that the Annapurnas have
learned to use modern equipment successfully despite predictions to
the contrary and have transferred improvements in working conditions
to their homes. Obviously, even with higher incomes they could not
afford the more modern equipment at the Center on an individual basis.
But many caterers have used some of the capital made available to them
or some of their higher earnings to pay for simple improvements, as
the fol lowing example illustrates:
I used to cook sitting on the floor. Since
then I've built this table, and I keep the
stove there. I feel it is safer because the
children are always moving around and if it
is on the floor, then I have to keep pay tg
attention that they do not come too close.
This sounds like an improvement that may be attributed to more money
at least as much as to training. AMM is currently lobbying, though, to
get gas connections in all the Annapurnas' homes to facilitate their
production 34
The Annapurna Mahila Mandal recognizes that only a limited number
of all Annapurnas can participate in food production based at the
Center, though the organization has plans to increase that number to
three hundred when it move to yet a larger building. 3 5  To enable
even more Annapurnas to tap new markets, AMM plans to experiment with
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constructing stalls throughout Bombay where they could sell snacks and
tiffins (dinners) to passersby, mainly to working class customers.
Representatives of the organization are negotiating with the local
government to get permission for construction. The response has been
favorable, in part because of the reputation and high visibility of
AMM.
The women involved in this component would produce the food at
home because of the limited space at the Multi-Purpose Center and use
the booths as their outlets. AMM would eventually like to establish
eighteen booths, one for each location where there is a local AMM
Center, at an estimated costs of Rs. 10,000 each. The proposal for
this component envisions five to six Annapurnas working per booth,
with estimated earnings of Rs. 400 per person. 36
The demand for the foods which these booths would supply is
uncertain, which is why AMM will phase them in over five years on an
experimental basis. As Martha Chen of the New Delhi office of Oxfam-
America pointed out, AMM must proceed carefully in entering new
markets, especially in a city like Bombay which is known for its
entrepreneurial spirit, because the perception is that "every vacuum
in the market is already filled."37
The expected earnings of Rs. 400 per month from the booth far
exceed Srinavasan's estimate of the home-based Annapurnas' income but
range from Rs. 50 to Rs. 200 less than Everett and Savara's
calculation of their net income in 1982, based on a thirty-day work
month. The work hours per day might be shorter for women working in
the booths than the seventeen-hour days put in by home-based caterers,
but the project proposal does not specify this. There are advantages
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and disadvantages to women leaving the house to work; the trade-off,
in its most simplistic form, is between the advantage of less
isolation and the difficulty of accomplishing household work and child
care tasks. The problem of drudgery and poor work conditions
presumably would continue for booth vendors because production would
still take place in the home.
AMM has another plan to relieve some of the drudgery involved in
food preparation for home-based caterers and Center-based workers
alike. It has proposed a centralized space for the procurement,
storage, and sale of a few staple ingredients which require grinding,
a tedious task when done on a small scale with rudimentary equipment.
There is some question, though, whether AMM can provide this service
to its members as cheaply and efficiently as the distributors who
already perform these services. 3 8 As long as freedom from debt to
suppliers removes the expoitative element from the transactions
between them and the Annapurnas, this plan might prove redundant.
The Annapurna Mahila Mandal has other plans on its agenda for
future action. It hopes to extend assistance to khannawallas in Pune,
Belgaum, and other cities so that they too can have access to bank
credit and establish a strong organization to deal with their
problems. Donors apparently are encouraging the organization to
postpone this expansion until it has carried out its efforts to
solidify its production-related activities in Bombay. 3 9
AMM wants to develop the strength of participation and leadership
skills that already exist in the Bombay organization. It has planned
workshops for representatives and regular meetings for area leaders.
It also wants to fund visits to and workshops with other women's
organizations like itself, such as the Sel f-Employed Women's
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Association in Ahmedhabad and the Working Women's Forum in Madras, so
that they can learn from each other's experience.
AMM is working to gain greater visibility and increase its
influence with policy makers. It is planning mass rallies by the
Annapurnas as well as a monthly newsletter. This is the next step in
promoting respect for the caterers and appreciation for their work
which began with their decision to call themselves Annapurnas rather
than khannawallas. Increased recognition should also give AMM more
leverage when it must deal with government officials to expand its
programs and may also help it with marketing its members' new products
to the public. Marketing now apparently depends a great deal on Prema
Purao's personal reputation and influence. 4 0
The Annapurna Mahila Mandal has developed over twelve years into
an organization which does much more than provide its members with
access to subsidized credit. While it is recognized (though not well
documented) that credit has increased the Annapurnas' earnings
somewhat, AMM has looked beyond credit to address other conditions
that affect business such as loss of customers, poor working
conditions, and isolation. The organization provides experience in
group decision making and offers social services which open up new
options for women who need to deal with personal and social problems.
This may prove to be where the true strength of AMM lies; the impact
of its social activities seem to be at least as important as the
opportunities for economic gain which it offers.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE NATURE OF ANNAPURNAS' INTERACTIONS WITH OTHERS
One way to understand the professional lives of the Annapurnas
and their role in the overall economy of Bombay is to consider their
relationships with the people with whom they have steady contact:
their customers, their suppliers, their creditors, their families and
each other. Looking at these relationships both before and after the
advent of the Annapurna Mahila Mandal also offers a different way of
evaluating the impact of the organization on its participants besides
measuring changes in income, length of work day, and working
conditions.
The initial change that the Annapurna Mahila Mandal (AMM)
instituted, the opportunity for home-based women caterers to borrow
small amounts of working capital from nationalized Indian banks, had
its most immediate impact on the relationship between the caterers and
their creditors. As is common for many informal sector small-scale
producers and vendors in Third World cities, the women caterers in
Bombay had no access to formal sector lending institutions and
borrowed from informal sector money lenders at high interest rates to
be able to buy their inputs, the raw foodstuffs they transformed into
meals for their textile worker clients. Sometimes they pawned their
jewelry, which in India serves as a nest egg for financial
emergencies, and sometimes the very utensils with which they cooked to
raise working capital to stay in business.
The interest rates of 12% to 25% per month charged by informal
sector lenders may seem exploitatively high when compared to the
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market rate of banks. But at least part of the difference between
informal and formal sector interest rates reflects the high risk
perceived in lending to very poor people who have no significant
collateral, the risk of lending directly to women with no male
intermediary, and the time cost to the lender involved in lending and
collecting small amounts of capital for short periods of time. High
interest rates do not necessarily constitute the exploitative part of
the relationship between money lenders and the caterers.
All the same, the extremely high interest rates which money
lenders charge the caterers do contribute to the low profits earned by
the women. By joining the AMM and borrowing their working capital at
a subsidized rate of 4% per year from Indian banks, caterers have been
able to realize significant savings in their production costs.
The AMM loan program does more than answer the caterers' need for
cheaper working capital. By providing an alternative source of
credit, it has changed the nature of the relationship between the
caterers and their moneylenders, who are often their raw food
suppliers as well. The more exploitative element in this relationship
is not the high interest rates, but rather the power the supplier/
moneylenders hold over their customers. Before the loan program,
women caterers who had bought on credit from their suppliers were
obl iged to continue buying from them and could not lower their
production costs by shopping around for better prices from other
grocers. When caterers fell deep into debt, suppliers sometimes
demanded sexual favors from the women in return for continuing to sell
to them on credit so that the women could stay in business. When
Prema Purao first began to organize the caterers, grocers used their
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monopolistic position and threatened to refuse
joined AMM and borrowed from banks instead of
played on the caterers' fears by warning them
the program would subject them to government
family planning. The caterers first began to
to supply any
from them.
that partici
inspections a
realize their
in relation to the grocers when these dire predictions did not come
true and they got their loans. Prema Purao's influence among the
women encouraged them to take the risk and apply for credit.
Participating in the AMM loan program has equalized the balance
of power somewhat between the caterers and the supplier/moneylenders
by increasing the caterers' bargaining power. With an alternative
source of credit, the women no longer depend on the largesse of a
certain grocer to sell them supplies. No longer indebted to the
grocers, the Annapurnas are not prey to their sexual harassment. The
caterers are also in the position to bargain with suppliers for better
prices for their inputs because they are no longer obl igated to buy
from ones who offer them credit. The access to subsidized credit
which AMM provides thus offers Annapurnas benefits on two levels: the
possibility of lower production costs through lower interest payments
and cheaper inputs, and greater bargaining power and less
exploitation in their relationship with suppliers.
The relationship between the home-based women caterers and their
customers, single males who work primarily in the textile mil1s in
Bombay, goes beyond a simpl e exchange of meal s for money. Boarders
arrange to eat two meal s cooked by the caterers. They eat at least
one meal in the caterers' homes and often have a meal sent to them at
work. The boarders may be single or married, but in either case they
live without their families in Bombay; many are migrants from rural
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women who
They also
pating in
nd forced
new power
areas. In a society like India's in which the family provides
workers with food and other services as well as emotional support,
unmarried men like the caterers' cl ients must purchase in the market
what female family members usually do for them as part of the unstated
family contract.
Except when disputes over payment arise, boarders generally eat
with the same caterer for long periods of time rather than switch from
one to another. A situation develops in which the caterers and their
homes serve as surrogate families for boarders. For example, it is
there that boarders find care when they are ill. The emotional
support and extra services boarders receive from the caterers and
their households fall outside the contract for meals in exchange for
money. They go beyond what even a regular customer in a neighborhood
restaurant could expect from the proporietors and staff.
This aspect of a surrogate family providing emotional support may
be one of the reasons single workers in Bombay choose to eat with
caterers rather than in more established, inexpensive restaurants such
as "rupee hotels." Another, probably more immediate, reason is that
eating in a caterer's home costs less than eating in even a very cheap
establ ishment. 1 A third reason is that the home-based caterers extend
credit to their customers, enabling them to eat even when they cannot
pay cash. In fact, many informal sector producers and vendors whose
clientele is very poor sell on credit for that is the only way their
customers can afford to consume their products regularly. 2
Two elements in the relationship between the caterers and their
clients, providing a surrogate family and meals on credit, came
together when the latter went on strike against the textile mills that
27
employed them. The strike was a particularly bitter and famous one,
lasting nearly two years from January, 1982 till the end of 1983.3
During the prolonged strike may caterers continued to feed their
boarders on credit. They supported in a way the unpaid workforce in
their dispute with their employers while at the same maintaining their
customers and gaining their loyalty for future times when the workers
would be able to pay. During the strike many workers left Bombay,
presumably for their rural homes, because they were no longer able to
support themselves in the city. By feeding them on credit, the
caterers in a way preserved the market for their product during a
period when effective demand could have dropped to almost nothing.
Many of the caterers' husbands worked for the textile factories
and were striking at the time. Without their husbands' income and
with little or no payment from their boarders, many caterers faced
unusually hard times during the strike. The work of the AMM was
especially important at this time in offering an alternative source of
working capital to caterers.
Despite the fact that the caterers continued to feed their
textile worker customers on credit during the 1973 strike, labor
organizers and workers criticized them at the time for charging too
much for meals, for "'making money off the workers,"' as one male
unionist said, and accused them of not supporting the strike. This
blame seems misplaced, since caterers earn a fraction of what the
workers do and enjoy no fringe benefits.
One explanation for the criticism of the caterers by labor may
have to do with the role of surrogate family they play for the textile
workers. Because the caterers fill a role normally played by unpaid
female family members in the Indian family, labor organizers and
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workers, and perhaps even the members of the caterers' family, may
have seen the caterers' work more as an extension of their role as
supportive and self-sacrificing female family members than as
businesswomen. The task of working and serving meals fal Is more
neatly into the category of unpaid activity than that of an economic
endeavor which provides income to those who undertake it. In fact,
because cooking in this case is an extension of women's work in the
home, people might not see the need to calculate the caterers'
earnings in terms of how much they make per hour, or how much they
sell their labor for. Critics of the home-based women producers thus
used different criteria for them than for the male wage laborers they
were supporting. An additional factor may have been that many of the
caterers were married, and others might have considered that whatever
income they earned was secondary to their husands', a kind of "pin
money," and so need not be high.
Another source of conflict between the caterers and their
customers which bears no relation to the textile workers' strike
arises from clients building up a debt with one caterer and, unwilling
or unable to pay, leaving her to begin a new arrangement with another.
Individual caterers had very little leverage with a truant customer
and few means to enforce payment of a debt. (One might note that
suffering nonpayment for the provision of meals is another way in
which caterers enable textile workers to live on a low wage.)
Since the organizational growth of the AMM, this situation has
changed. Individual caterers have gained bargaining power with
delinquent customers by agreeing with other caterers not to accept a
new cl ient until they have found out with whom he last boarded and
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checked that he owes that caterer no money. This solidarity among
Annapurnas gives individual caterers collective strength to use in
collecting the debts owed them and makes it difficult for boarders to
escape payment.
When producers attempt to collect debts from workers, one might
assume that the balance of power leans in favor of the producer, but
in this case, before they organized under AMM, the caterers seem to be
the party with less power. The bias giving male wage workers the
benefit of the doubt over female home-based producers described before
probably contributes to this. Also, in India as elsewhere, men and
women of the same class do not wield equal influence. Thus individual
women caterers have little recourse, except perhaps for help from male
family members, in trying to collect debts from clients. The
collective action of AMM members is thus an appropriate response to
exploitative behavior on the part of their male customers and serves
to balance the power between the two sets of actors.
Membership in AMM has brought about changes in the relationship
between caterers. One example of this surfaces in their decision to
support each other against abuses by their customers. Before AMM,
when customers changed caterers without paying a debt, the women would
argue with each other about the situation rather than recognizing and
pursuing the client as the wrong-doer. Now they protect each other,
and themselves, by making sure that no new customer owes money to the
last Annapurna with whom he boarded.
Guaranteeing each other's loans requires a great deal of trust,
and belonging to an organization that brings together other women like
them who previously worked in isolation has affected the caterers'
attitudes towards each other. The relationship between Annapurnas has
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evolved from one of competition to a more cooperative one.
Annapurnas work less in isolation than they did before
AMM and come together for various activities. They buy their
supplies collectively, produce snacks for sale together at
Multi-Purpose Center, and take short trips together to othe
India. They also come
suggestions and their
and family problems,
representative~to brin
AMM meetings ser
spend most of their
opportunity to meet
sanctioned purpose.
r
together at local AMM meetings to disc
needs, which may relate to business c
and to decide what they would li
g up at Bombay-wide meetings.
ve three purposes. First, women who
day working inside their homes
outside on a regular basis for a
This is important, for even in urban
joining
cooking
the AMM
parts of
uss their
or social
ke their
normal 1 y
have the
socially
areas in
India the movement of women, depending on class, is generally
restricted to purposes of accomplishing household chores or paid work.
Socializing with other women is considered frivolous, and spending
more time than necessary in public places casts aspersions on the
honor of a woman's family. 5
Second, by discussing their situations with other caterers,
Annapurnas can realize that the personal and business-related issues
they face are shared by others. AMM meetings provide a rare forum for
bringing up problems like alcoholic husbands, physical abuse by
husbands, desertion, and other problems that are not readily discussed
in Indian society, or for that matter in others. As AMM members,
women have also begun to support rather than criticize each other when
facing family problems. They have broken with the common wisdom that
"'a good wife is one who takes everything from her husband, beating
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and all without saying anything back"' and have become less suspicious
women's behavior. 6
The third benefit of AMM meetings is that they offer women an
opportunity to practice speaking and voicing their opinions in public.
They can develop this skill in a relatively supportive atmosphere,
among women who are their peers, and those who are elected
representatives get practice presenting the proposals of their
constituency.
Perhaps the most radical activity the Annapurnas carry out
through AMM is the recreational trips they take together to places
outside Bombay. The visits provide an opporunity for the women to
know each other better, to learn more about their country, and to
escape their unrelenting 18-hour-per day schedule at home. The trips
offer a leisure and learning experience that is normally unheard of
for poor women both because of their poverty and their sex. The
organized visits express the women's freedom of movement and go
against convention in a society where women's movement is limited and
sanctioned for only certain prescribed reasons.
AMM thus provides its members with many economic incentives to
work together and many social benefits from interacting together. It
has hel ped the Annapurnas see each other as allies and co-workers
rather than only as competitors by establishing situations in which
they benefit from supporting each other.
Many of the aspects of the relationships between the Annapurnas
and their families that are relevent to the AMM have been touched upon
in previous sections. The nature of these relationships before the
advent of AMM has not been well documented, but one can get a feeling
for it by looking at the changes the organization has brought about.
32
Each of the changes is a break with tradition in its own way.
Annapurnas report high aspirations for their daughters' employment
opportunities and a greater interest in their education and training
since the daughters have begun participating in the vocational
training program in sewing held at the AMM Multi-Purpose Center.
Often Indian parents, including mothers, tend to concentrate their
hopes and resources on the education of their sons at the expense of
their daughters. The logic is threefold: that an investment in sons
will yield a higher return since men earn more then women in the labor
market; that the closer to home daughters find work, the less risk
there is that they will tarnish the family honor; and that daughters
usually help their mothers with household work or paid, home-based
work and their labor would be missed.
The organized trips break with tradition too because they are
unchaperoned, women-only excursions in a society where among certain
classes only men have the prerogative to travel alone and for
pleasure. In a way they are a subtle assault on the male monopoly on
publ ic space in India. To my knowledge, AMM has not documented the
effects of women's higher earnings on the relationship between them
and their husbands, though other women's income-generating projects
often use this as one measure of success.
What the organization does, though, is provide services that
reduce its members' vulnerability to abusive treatment by their
husbands. By offering access to legal services, a women's shelter for
temporary refuge, and even just a place where they can discuss their
problems openly with little fear of criticism, AMM offers women an out
from situations in which they would have little choice but to remain
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passively in a relationship. These services fill a gap for poor women
in Bombay; although they are not unique, they are indeed very rare.
Again, the options made available by AMM shift the balance of power
a little by offering women some leverage in bargaining that they did
not have before.
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CHAPTER THREE
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ANNAPURNAS' WORK:
DOES AMM FACE LIMITS?
To understand the Annapurnas' work and the activities of the
Annpurna Mahila Mandal, it is necessary to place them in the context
of the debate about the nature of work in the informal sector and its
relationship to the formal sector. This section will cover briefly
the evolution of liberal theory about the informal sector and policies
to deal with it, and contrast this with neo-Marxist analysis of
economies in developing countries.
Liberal as well as neo-Marxist analysis first identified the
street vendors, rag pickers, repair-persons, and other people not
employed by industry in Third-World cities as "marginal ," operating
totally outside the "modern" economy and retaining many of the customs
they had supposedly brought with them from rural areas. Later studies
demonstrated that in fact these people were integrated into the
"modern" economy and city life, either by working on and off in formal
sector businesses or producing goods and services that were purchased
by establ ished firms.1 Some found that many informal sector workers
were quite productive and implied that with some changes they could
become even more so. 2
Liberal theory then characterized informal sector enterprises in
the following way: ease of entry; use of indigenous resources; family
ownership; small scale; labor intensive; and operating in unregulated
and highly competitive markets. 3  It viewed the high level of
competition among producers as a very positive feature and identified
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it as one of the sources of high productivity in the sector. Given
this productivity and the low capital-to-labor ratio found in
unregistered, small-scale producers, the informal sector came to be
seen as the one which could provide employment to the majority of
urban workers who had not been and would not be absorbed by "modern"
industry. It also began to see the urban economy in Third World
countries as a continuum of enterprises rather than as two distinct
sectors. 4
Policy members identified several ways to enhance productivity in
the informal sector and enable it to grow in order to employ more
people. Some policies focused on supply. These included providing
access to credit from formal lending institutions, improving informal
producers' access to steady supplies of high quality inputs, and
improving the distribution of informal sector goods. Other policies
sought to increase demand for the goods and services of the sector.
These included incentives or requirements to formal sector private
firms and the public sector to purchase from the informal sector.
Another policy proposed the revocation of government policies, such as
overvalued currency, which subsidized the cost of production in the
formal sector and gave it a falsely competitive advantage over
informal sector production. This was intended to increase demand for
informal sector goods by making them more competitive.
Al 1 of these pol icies are based on the assumption that the
linkages between firms in the formal and informal sector are benign,
and that strengthening them will be advantageous for both, but
especially for the informal sector. Higher productivity in the
informal sector and increased demands for its products are expected to
result in evol utionary growth in the sector. 5 That is, liberal
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theorists predict that the informal sector will be able to employ the
large numbers of people in urban areas which "modern," formal sector
firms have not expanded enough to employ.
The efforts undertaken and planned by the Annapurna Mahila Mandal
are expressions of liberal policies to assist informal sector
producers. The Differential Rate of Interest bank loan program in
which AMM participates is a governmental program to provide credit to
borrowers who are normally ineligible. Its Center-based catering
project is designed to raise the Annapurnas' productivity through
access to improved technology and new work arrangements, and it seeks
to supply the demand of formal sector (in this case white-collar)
workers. The proposed vending booth project seeks to improve
distribution of the home-based Annapurnas' product so that they can
reach a new market with it. Finally, the proposed staples
distribution center would give the Annapurnas access to more refined
inputs, which would effectively improve their productivity by
relieving them of part of the production process.
Neo-Marxist theory views the informal sector very differently,
though it too no longer recognizes a split of Third World urban
economies into two separate sectors. It sees these economies as
consisting of a continuum ranging from poor, small producers and
vendors to large, heavily capitalized industries owned by
capital ists. 6 The theory contends that not only do "informal sector"
producers not operate in a totally separate sphere from "formal
sector" firms, but that the latter are able to produce at a profit
because of the linkages between smal1er and larger producers.
Contrary to 1iberal theory, neo-Marxist theory contends that these
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linkages are exploitative rather benign, and it does not foresee that
strengthening them would benefit poorer producers.
Neo-Marxist analysis bases its explanation of the informal
sector-formal sector relationship on the opposing interests of capital
and labor. The profits to capitalists in the industrial sector of the
Third World depend on keeping payments to labor low, in part so that
their products will be competitive in the international market. At
the same time, they depend on a reliable skilled labor force and
cannot substitute workers at wil 1 with others from the reserve army of
labor when wage demands go too high.7  This skil led force thus enjoys
relatively high wages and benefits unavailable to informal sector
workers, yet it earns a fraction of what their counterparts in First
World countries earn. 8
Capitalists need to keep the cost of this skilled labor force to
a minimum to maintain their rate of profit, and they depend on
informal sector producers to do this in two ways. First, according to
Portes and Walton, they keep the number of workers directly employed
by formal sector firms to a minimum, contracting out as much
production as possible to piece-workers and small informal sector
firms. The highly competitive nature of the informal sector, which
keeps the price of these inputs low, depends on very low returns to
labor, or the extraction of a high rate of surplus value. Neo-Marxist
theory thus considers this competition a negative factor while liberal
theory views it as a highly positive factor.
Second, informal sector products and services cater to the
"poverty life-style"9 of manual or temporary workers employed directly
or indirectly by formal sector firms. Portes and Walton note that the
cost of basic goods and services in the formal market in Third World
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countries equals and even exceeds the cost of the same goods in First
World countries, yet the wages of industrial workers in the Third
World are much less than those in the First World. According to neo-
Marxist theory, Third World industrialists depend on the informal
sector to subsidize the cost of its labor force by producing
inexpensive goods and services. This allows workers to survive on
their earnings and reduces their demands for higher wages. Third
World capitalists' comparative advantage in the international market
depends on lower wage rates than those in industrialized countries. If
wage rates were to rise, their profits would decline.
The neo-Marxist theory provides a useful framework by which to
analyze the work of the Annapurnas and their role in the larger
economy. The fact that they produce informally for formal sector
workers at very low rates of remuneration makes for a very rich case.
It is interesting to see what implications a neo-Marxist analysis of
the Annapurnas' work has for the role of the organization established
to assist them when it carries out projects based on liberal policies.
The world-system perspective that Portes and Walton describe in
Labor, Class, and the International System permits a different
analysis of the Annapurnas' work and the prospects for increasing
their income than does liberal theory. The world-system perspective
provides a framework which explains the significance of relationships
between the caterers and other actors in the Bombay economy and allows
us to go beyond questions of project implementation methods in
understanding the areas of strength and weaknesses in the Annapurna
Mahila Mandal program for business upgrading. The relationship
between the caterers and their customers is the key element in the
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world-system analysis of the case of the Annapurnas.
In 1984 Annapurnas charged Rs. 160 to Rs. 170 per month per
worker for two subtantial meals. With a textile worker's average
salary at Rs. 713, this means he spends roughly 25% of his income for
food. According to AMM documents, workers choose boarding over even
cheap restaurants because the caterers charge less and serve better
quality, plentiful food.
The low price of the textile workers' meals depends in part on
Annapurnas' accepting low earnings and their unpaid family labor
accepting food for work. Annapurnas earn little, if any, cash income
from catering. They use the workers' payment to buy cooking
suppl ies. The majority of their monthly earnings show up directly as
food for their family's consumption, and they receive little cash
surplus. Using the Rs. 400 per month estimate, Annapurnas earn Rs. 13
per day based on a sixteen-hour per day, seven-day work week.
Caterers' work nearly double the formal sector work day every day of
the week. They even neglect health problems because they cannot
afford to lose work time to visit a doctor.1 0 They take no annual
vacation either. They enjoy none of the benefits that unionized
employees of the formal sector often do. They have no health
insurance, and their poverty and low profits preclude them from saving
for retirement. Finally, the rudimentary technology and lack of
ventilation and services in their home-based kitchens make their work
physically difficult, hazardous, and time consuming.
The characteristics which make the Annapurnas more competitive
than more formal restaurants turn out to depend on the extraction of a
high rate of surplus value from the caterers and their assistants.
But who benefits from this surplus value? One might think that the
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textile worker customers benefit. After all, they spend approximately
25% on food, a little more on inexpensive housing (either in barracks-
type lodging or with an Annapurna's family), and have the rest to
spend or save. But most are migrants from rural areas and, presumably
contribute to their families' support there while establishing
themselves in Bombay in preparation for their families' arrival. The
Annapurnas' low prices permit part of this savings or transfer of
resources to boarders' rural family members to take place. If
Annapurnas raised their prices in order to improve their working
conditions and earn more per hour, the textile workers might be
unable to support their rural families or establish savings on their
current wages. They would either have to earn more or stop
contributing to their families' income.
In other words, Annapurnas subsidize the cost of food to the
textile workers who board with them, ultimately relieving some
pressure for higher wages the workers might place on their formal -
sector employers. As Portes and Walton explain:
Informal sector activities result therefore
in an output of goods and services at prices
lower than those that could be offered under
formal production arrangements. Although the
most obvious interpretation of this price
edge is that it permits the survival of
informal enterprises, the most important
aspect is that it maximizes surplus
extraction by reducing labor rIroduction
costs for firms in formal sector.
According to this analysis, it is the textile industry capitalists who
ultimately profit from the surplus value of the Annapurnas' work since
the latter permit the reproduction of the formal sector labor force at
low cost.
Portes and Walton describes the class structure of urban
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economies in developing countries in terms of four categories:
domestic and foreign capital owners, executives and managers;
professionals and technicians; clerical and manual wage labor in
public enterprises and private industry and services; and casual wage
labor and the self-employed in petty production and trade. 1 2 The
authors point out that the first class is dependent on the rate of
surplus value, which "translates in turn into a consistent drive
against the portion of the product going as salaries and wages to
Classes 2 and 3".13 In the case of the Annapurnas, the textile
industrialists (Class 1) use the caterers (Cl ass 4) to "cheapen the
cost of reproduction and reduce upward pressures on wages" from
textile workers (Class 3) and, via the AMM Center-based catering
project, from bank employees (Classes 2 and 3).
In the case of poor formal sector employees, cheap basic
necessities al low them to survive on their wages, support their
families and perhaps save a little. For slightly wealthier classes,
the Annapurna's inexpensive though high quality food may contribute,
along with the goods of other informal sector producers, to a more
comfortable, if not "seignorial," level of consumption than they would
otherwise be able to afford.14
One detail indicates that at least some textile industrialists
recognize the role the Annapurnas play in supplying cheap food to
their employees and the use the caterers make of government-issued
ration cards. According to Martha Chen, textile firms have been known
to use their influence to make sure that ration shops were located in
areas where textile workers lived and ate, and that these were well
supplied.1 5 This makes it more convenient for Annapurnas, as well as
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married workers' wives, to exchange their boarders' (or husbands')
ration cards for suppl ies. Firms thus support not only access to
subsidized goods, but easy access, to keep their workers' food costs
down. The location of ration stores in the neighborhood keeps down
the time, energy, and money costs of getting some inputs for
Annapurnas and further encourages them to accept ration cards as
payment.
The State also has an interest in good relations between the
labor force and industry. It demonstrates this by subsidizing the
cost of workers' living expenses, or cost of reproduction, by
providing them with ration cards that can be used to purchase certain
suppl ies at below-market prices. This gesture is an expression of
concern for the population's standard of living or an attempt to
obtain its support, but in the case of the textile workers, it also
may have hel ped to keep wage demands by labor on industry from
disrupting production.
The Annapurnas play a role in supporting the cost of reproducing
part of the formal sector textile workforce not only under everyday
conditions, but also when the demand for the labor force drops off or
it is out of work. The caterers contributed to the maintenance of the
reservoir of inactive skilled labor when textile workers called a
strike against their industry both in 1973 and 1982.
During both strikes Annapurnas continued to feed their boarders
even though they could not pay. Whatever the impetus for the
Annpurnas' support, whether it was due to class solidarity, kinship or
affective ties, or a need to preserve customers for better days in the
future, their action lends itself to two analyses. On the one hand,
Annapurnas enabled the striking workers to survive physically without
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wages longer than they might otherwise have been abl e to. This
enabled workers to extend the period of bargaining power with the
firms. As the 1982 strike wore on, however, no settlement was reached
and workers gradual ly trickled back to their jobs, if firms still
accepted them. Many reportedly lost their jobs and left the city. On
the other hand, the Annapurnas maintained their textile worker
customers at no wage cost whatsoever to the firms, which had access
to the same pool of skilled workers after the strikes, if they chose
to rehire them. This is not to say that the strikes cost the firms
nothing in lost production; they did. But the firms were not
responsible for the cost of maintaining the work force during those
periods.
It is significant, in terms of the world system perspective,
first that Annapurnas supported the workers financially during the
1982 strike and later that many workers eventually returned to rural
areas after the strike dragged on and finally petered out. Annapurnas
carried out in a modified way the role of the traditional subsistence
economy as a mechanism for the reproduction of part of the out-of-work
urban labor force.
Theorists such as Samir Amin believe that traditional rural
subsistence enclaves support urban workers who return to their rural
origins during times of low demand for their labor. They argue that
the surpluses of rural subsistence economies thus relieve
industrialists of the cost of the reproduction of the surplus labor
force upon which they can draw again when they require workers.16
Portes and Walton believe that the role of the traditional
subsistence economy is "fundamental but not exclusive" in explaining
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the maintenance of the Third World labor force worldwide.1 7  The two
authors point out that the subsistance agricultural sector has been
declining or stagnating world wide and find it difficult to explain
how a decl ining sector can "reproduce and eventually absorb a
continuously expanding urban labor force." 1 8 They also cite migration
studies which do not show large-scale return migration to rural areas.
Portes and Walton propose that the same mechanism of the subsistence
sector supporting the mass of surplus urban workers does exists, but
that it occurs within urban areas.
The case of the Annapurnas and textile workers is one in which
both the rural subsistence sector and its modified urban equivalent
play a role. Annapurnas absorbed the cost of the striking or
"surplus" textile workers until other living expenses or the prospect
of never being re-hired forced them to return to their rural places of
origin or seek jobs in other cities. Because the Annapurnas' work
(selling cooked food) was so close in nature to a subsistence activity
(a family member providing cooked food) and was more essential to the
reproduction of the workers than, say, credit from a shoemaker,
striking workers were able to remain in Bombay without resources
longer than they might have had they no source of food.
After a time the Annapurnas' support must have been insufficient,
and other needs forced some of those workers from rural areas to
return there and be maintained by the rural subsistence sector. The
Annapurnas, then served as sort of an intermediate step in supporting
the costs of the reproduction of the textile workers. It seems
logical that workers would eventually look elsewhere for support (or
another source of employment) since Annapurnas, who are deeply
integrated into the cash economy of the city, could only support the
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cost of feeding the workers for so long before their own need for cash
income for their own and their family's survival would force them to
stop feeding their striking boarders.
Interestingly enough, the State at this point intervened in the
relationship between workers and industry in another, albeit indirect,
way. The nationalized banks agreed to forgive extra interest charges
that Annapurnas incurred when they could not repay their loans on time
because of their foregone income during the strike. This occurred
after AMM interceded on behalf of its members, who previously had
repaid very regularly. This grace undoubtedly relieved the economic
pressure on Annapurnas to some extent and perhaps permitted them to
continue their support of the striking textile workers longer than
they might otherwise have been able. The State thus assisted the
Annapurnas in their support of the workers and contributed to the
maintenance of the striking labor force at no direct cost to the
textile industry.
Analyzing the Annapurnas' situation in light of Portes and
Walton's world-system perspective enables us to understand their work
not just as the efforts of individual poor women to use their skills
and meager resources to earn income for themselves and their families
but also as the activity of a class of workers who carry out a very
specific role in the urban, national, and international economies.
According to Portes and Walton's framework, Annapurnas absorb part of
the cost of reproducing members of one segment of the industrial labor
force by charging them only for the value of the food they prepare and
almost nothing for their own labor. The surplus value extracted from
the caterers' labor is channeled through the textile workers, who
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enjoy part of it by being able to support their rural -based families
or save on their modest salaries, to the textile industrialists. The
firm owners can extract greater profit from their business thanks to
the Annapurnas' self-exploitation because it allows their workers to
survive on lower wages than they would need if the costs of their
reproduction were not subsidized and had to be purchased in the formal
economy. The surplus value extracted from the Annapurnas reduces the
conflict between labor and capital to some extent, but it is
insufficient to prevent the eruption of disputes between them, as the
1973 and 1982 textile strikes demonstrate.
The relationship between Annapurnas and their suppliers of inputs
and credit can also be examined in light of neo-Marxist theory.
Contrary to liberal theory, which indicates that the links between
informal sector producers and formal sector suppliers of inputs and
credit are for the most part benign and can be enhanced through
policy, neo-Marxist theory focuses on the essentially exploitative
nature of the relationship between the actors and denies that
reformist policy can engender any significant change. Evidence from
the Annapurnas' case seems to fall somewhere in between these two
views.
For one thing, the business people who supply the caterers with
staples and credit cannot be categorized as belonging to the formal
sector. Their businesses are larger and more lucrative than the
Annapurnas; but they may not be registered or legal. The suppl iers
and lenders fal 1 somewhere on the continuum stretching -from "stable
wage-work" to "true self-employment" that Bromley and Gerry
describe.19 What matters more in this case is that these entrepreneurs
are weal thier, not whether their businesses are registered or not.
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Suppl iers and creditors may be of the same caste as the caterers, but
their greater wealth, their place in the hierarchy of supply channels,
and their sex gives them the advantage in their relationship with the
caterers.
Not all elements in the relationship between the suppliers of
inputs and the Annapurnas are exploitative. No evidence indicates
that suppliers restricted the caterers' access to certain goods or
sold them inferior quality inputs. Suppliers charge higher prices for
staples than wholesalers or subsidized, government-run ration shops,
but this is normal and reflects a charge for the service they provide
as retailers; they sell in small amounts and save their customers
expense in time and transport cost by locating in convenient areas. 2 0
An exploitative element enters the relationship between caterers
and suppliers because of the former's lack of sufficient working
capital. With sufficient individual capital or by joining together
with others, caterers ca
advantage of wholesale
debt, slip into a weaker
prey to exploitation. I
price because they cannot
may also face a form o
which reflects not only
creditors, but also thei
The results of the
confirm the liberal vie
n afford to buy in larger quantities and take
prices. Without it caterers can fal 1 into
position vis-a-vis their creditors, and fall
n debt to a supplier, caterers must accept his
purchase their inputs elsewhere. Debtors
extra-market exploitation, sexual coercion,
the greater economic power of suppliers and
r favored position as men in a sexist society.
intervention of the Annapurna Mahila Mandal
w that policies and programs can improve the
relationship between informal sector producers and their suppliers.
The access to credit at low interest rates and the social
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infrastructure that facilitates group buying which AMM offers equalize
to some extent the relationship between its members and the suppliers.
These features provide the caterers with some bargaining power, as was
discussed in Chaper 2, and enables AMM members to become price-makers
rather than price-takers and avoid the incidence of sexual coercion.
The cooperation of a group of poor women enables them to approximate
the market power of individual suppliers in a monopolistic position.
AMM interventions also offer Annapurnas the opportunity to bypass
the supplier altogether and buy directly from wholesalers. When the
organization experiments with bul k buying and distribution, and small
groups of Annapurnas buy collectively, they seem to benefit from
savings in the cost of inputs. What they are really doing, however,
is taking on the work previously performed by the retailer. Whether
or not this actually saves the Annapurnas any money when they count
the value of their time and effort has not been calculated.
However policies and programs may alter the power relationship
between Annapurnas and their suppliers, this change will not affect
the Annapurnas' role in the economy of Bombay or India in any
significant way. In that sense, the tendency for pol icy makers to
identify moneylenders and middlemen as the major sources of
exploitation in the lives of informal sector producers is misguided.
To believe that simply altering the nature of the relationship between
suppliers and producers will enable producers to expand their
businesses in a significant way seems inadequate, especially in light
of the world-system framework. Simply modifying the terms of trade
will not change the function of informal sector producers in the
overall economy; they will most likely continue to face severe
limitations in improving their income.
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limitations in improving their income.
The neo-Marxist as well as liberal theories about the informal
sector deal with the relationshp among self-employed producers in
terms of competition with each other and ultimately in terms of
whether the sector will experience evolutionary or involutionary
growth. Evol utionary growth means that a larger labor force can be
incorporated into the sector at higher average income level s.21
Involutionary growth means either that more people can be employed,
but at lower incomes, or that higher average income could be earned
only if fewer people were incorporated.
The liberal theory views strong competition as a positive aspect,
which will spur greater productivity in the sector. Because it
believes in the potential for higher productivity and assumes that the
linkages between the formal and informal sectors are benign, the
liberal theory foresees the capacity for evolutionary growth in the
informal sector. Neo-Marxist theory views severe competition as
negative because it is based on cutting production costs, which
depends to a great extent on the ability of producers to keep
remunerations to labor at a minimum. It predicts that growth in the
informal sector will be involutionary.
The evidence from the Annapurna Mahila Mandal case provides
support for the involutionary growth argument. Though AMM does not
(at least as yet) restrict membership, it can offer opportunities for
scaling up caterers' earnings and businesses in a significant way to
only a fraction of its membership. The experience of the organization
indicates that more caterers may join, but that only a few will earn
an income greater than average and that the majority will at best
51
maintain or slightly increase their current level of income.
AMM does not try to limit competition among caterers by excluding
new members. In fact, it encourages cooperation among members and has
sought to involve as many home-based caterers in Bombay as possible.
AMM differs in this respect from other associations of informal sector
workers described by Lisa Peattie, which organize to improve their
working conditions and gain recognition from authorities. 2 2 These
limit competition in one of two ways: they either make membership a
prerequisite for working in the trade and strictly limit new members,
or members enjoy such significant business advantages that non-members
cannot compete effectively in the market.
The AMM approach, in contrast, has been to expand from fourteen
to over five thousand members and to continue to accept other Bombay
caterers as members. As noted in Chaper 2, membership in AMM seems
to have decreased rather than increased competition among home-based
caterers who are members. Annapurnas have seen the benefits of
cooperation, including buying collectively in bulk and cracking down
on indebted boarders. The cost of competition among Annapurnas does
not appear to be high. Members do not seem to use the savings from
lower interest rates and cheaper input costs to cut their prices to
customers, which would be one way to compete for boarders. They seem
instead to use the savings to stabilize their businesses. Also,
caterers may not need to cut prices to compete for boarders because of
the familial nature of the arrangements between caterers and boarders.
This may deter shifts from one caterer to another despite a decrease
in demand. Caste, vil lage, or family ties may bond a boarder to a
certain caterer until unusual circumstances, such as great
indebtedness, arise.
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AMM also has plans to organize caterers in other cities so that
they too will have access to bank loans and greater bargaining power.
Including Annapurnas from the other cities in AMM will not create
competition for customers among Bombay-based Anapurnas, though it
could conceivably increase competition for capital now that funds for
the subsidized DRI bank loans may be drying up.
Feminist beliefs and an ideology of class solidarity account at
least in part for the tendency of AMM to be inclusive rather than
excl usive. The organization has had to sacrifice these bel iefs
somewhat, though, in undertaking its new economic components, which
are designed to provide alternative markets to caterers in the face of
declining demand from textile workers. The evidence from AMM efforts
to establish a catering service for middle class consumers and a
series of booths for selling food to working-class passersby indicate
the necessity to select a tiny minority of Annapurnas who will benefit
from the activities. At present, women who have been hardest hit by
the strike or family problems have priority in participating in the
new Center-based catering activity, though it is not clear how the
final selection is made. 2 3
After a year of operation in 1984, only twenty out of over five
thousand AMM members have participated in the program to train
caterers to produce snacks and meal s for a middle class clientele.
Between twenty and forty Annapurnas currently produce food at the AMM
Mul ti-purpose Center. Though AMM staff attributes the low number of
participants to this being a relatively new component, they plan to
employ no more than fifty, or possibly 300, caterers even when the
operation will be in full swing.
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Several factors determine the limited number of women who can
expect to earn a living from the Center-based catering business. For
one, in an attempt to improve the Annapurnas' working conditions,
their productivity, and the uniform quality of their product, AMM
decided that production for this business should take place at the
Multi-Purpose Center rather than in the caterers' homes. The
kitchen/workshop space at the Center physically limits the number of
women who can work there, and the cost of its sophisticated equipment
and of space in Bombay preclude any expansion that would allow for the
employment of a significantly greater number of Annapurnas.
Another problem involves demand. So far AMM has not received
enough orders to employ even forty women consistently. This can be
attributed to the difficulty new businesses experience in building up
a clientele. Only time will tell whether AMM will be able to compete
with other producers in the market providing food to middle-class
consumers. The caterers may find that the only way to compete with
the other producers' prices will be to minimize their own labor costs.
This will certainly create a dilemma for an organization whose goal is
to enable women to improve their earnings and work conditions.
The Center-based catering component provides evidence that
supports this theory that earnings will not reflect the value of the
Annapurnas' labor. Caterers earn Rs. 250 per month while training and
Rs. 325 for their work after training.* The latter figure compares
favorably with home-based caterers' estimated earnings; it actually
exceeds them because of the shifts at the Center are five hours long,
*This policy correctly assumes an opportunity cost for the women's
training time and recognizes that most could not afford to lose current
income while training to earn future income.
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much shorter than the home-based caterers' sixteen-hour days. AMM
caterers also save the expense of using their own equipment at home
and enjoy a healthier work environment.
AMM currently must subsidize these earnings, though, since net
profits from food sales do not yet cover them. Profits over the first
ten months ranged from Rs. 368 to Rs. 3,357 per month, which cover the
earning of from one to ten caterers. 24 At this point AMM absorbs the
loss but obviously cannot continue to do so if it is to function as a
business.
AMM recognized that the Center-based catering operation could
only reach a fraction of its members and has sought to develop
alternative markets for even more Annapurnas by proposing the
establishment of eighteen booths around Bombay to sell food to
working-class passersby. It is not lack of production space in this
case that will limit the member of Annapurnas who benefit from the
booth project, but rather the uncertainty of entering the market for
street foods, which is new to them. Even if initial market tests
involving Annapurnas in booths go well, the full project of eighteen
booths will only provide a market for 108 women. The estimated
earnings of Annapurnas staffing booths compare well with those from
home-based production. Proposals do not specify the number of work
hours per day though, and women would still produce in their homes.
AMM predicts that the existence of these booths would alleviate
somewhat the problem of no weekly day off for home-based caterers
without increasing competition. Home-based caterers could recommend
the booths to their regular clients as a once-a-week substitute for
home-based catering. Project proposals predict that Annapurnas could
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thus enjoy a day off without risking a permanent loss of customers to
competitors, but they do not specify why booths would not capture the
home-based caterers' market.
Two ambitious elements of the AMM economic program to help
Annapurnas adjust to declining demand from textile workers, the
Center-based catering project and the establishment of booths, thus
will reach only about 160 women out of over 5,000. The organization
recognizes the limitations of these projects and proposes to establish
an AMM center for storing, grinding, and distributing several staple
inputs which it says would benefit the rest of the Annapurnas who
cannot participate in the "up-scaled" projects. But the economic
efficiency of this last proposed plan is dubious and thus may never
benefit them.
The four economic components of AMM take the form of a pyramid,
starting at the top with Center-based catering, vending booths,
staples distribution center, and the loan program. The one involving
the fewest Annapurnas, the most sophisticated equipment, and the
greatest change in work conditions is at the top and the one involving
all members but the least change in income and work conditions at the
bottom. The other two fall along the spectrum in between.
Center-based caterers have access to the training, technology,
and organized marketing that allow them to reach a new, slightly
wealthier market. Their productivity is presumably higher because of
the equipment at the Center, and their earnings and work hours reflect
this.
Annapurnas who will sell their homed-cooked food in booths will
also try to tap a new market, but they will only benefit from improved
distribution channels for their products, not from better technology
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and higher productivity. The level of quality of the food they
currently produce presumably will satisfy the working-class market for
street food which they hope to supply. Their production conditions
will remain the same; the only difference will be that these
Annapurnas will have the opportunity (or difficulty) of working
outside their homes at least part of the time.
The activities of the AMM staple supply center would affect many
more Annapurnas, though it will probably not be large enough to serve
all of them. The availability of pre-ground grains and spices is
designed to lessen the drudgery, or increase the productivity of home-
based caterers who otherwise perform this task themselves.
Final ly, the loan program benefits al1 AMM members, and
membership is open to all female home-based caterers who want to join.
The changes it has prompted have already been discussed. Generally,
though, it seems at best to have increased income only slightly and in
most cases to have stabilized Annapurnas' businesses.
The current or projected results of these four efforts indicate
that only a fraction of AMM members can enjoy higher earnings (or the
same pay for fewer hours), improved technology, and access to
different markets. The AMM experience suggests that at least in the
food service part of the informal sector, growth will be involutionary
rather than evolutionary.
AMM finds itself in a dilemma. It is committed to including as
many home-based caterers in Bombay as want to join and to helping them
improve their earnings and work conditions. But AMM can offer
significant changes to only a few Annapurnas because of uncertain
demand in an already crowded economy and because of the high capital
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technology in a "formal sector" building like the Multi-Purpose
Center. AMM does not show the characteristics of invol utionary growth
by excluding caterers; rather, it includes a greater number of
caterers, the majority of whom suffer declining or constant incomes,
while only a few can take advantage of new markets and higher
productivity to increase theirs. This dilemma of AMM has implications
for the focus of its future efforts and the relative importance of its
social and economic programs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DILEMMAS AND CHOICES: QUESTIONS FOR AMM'S FUTURE
The difficulties that the Annapurna Mahila Mandal has encountered
in its attempts to help its members maintain or increase their income
in the face of declining demand for their services suggest support for
analyses which predict involutionary growth in the informal sector.
Proposals for the projects creating vending booths and the staples
distribution center reveal the organization's realization that on the
one hand, bank loans alone are insufficient to deal with the economic
situtation most Annapurnas find themselves in, and on the other hand,
that the elaborateness of AMM's first attempt to counter this problem
limited to a fraction of all members the number of Annapurnas who
might benefit from it.
The multiple goals of AMM reveal the dilemma the organization
finds itself in. Its philosophy is based on outreach and the
incl usion of as many participants as want to join, so it proposes to
expand AMM to other cities. At the same time it seeks to improve the
income and working conditions of its current members. Yet limited
resources and market demand restrict the number of women AMM can
benefit with its most change-inducing projects, so it proposes other
less costly efforts whose benefits will be more widespread but will
promote less dramatic changes than the Center-based catering business.
AMM is not alone in this quandary of how to assist with the
greatest impact the largest number of self-employed informal sector
producers. At least in the short-run, the implementation of programs
for small-scale enterprise which reflect the liberal analysis that
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there exists a potential for greater productivity, higher demand, and
thus evolutionary growth in the informal sector results in a similar
paradox. Programs may increase or stablize the productivity and
income of part of a group of producers within the informal sector, but
they must, by nature of their limited staff and funding, exclude the
majority. The programs born to promote evolutionary growth seem to be
able to function because they select an elite among the informal
sector self-employed, who then enjoy advantages that make competition
among other producers more fierce.
The nature of the Annapurnas' role in the informal sector offers
an explanation of why the Annapurna Mahila Mandal's more ambitious
programs can reach only a fraction of its members. AMM has followed
programs primarily based on liberal theories which predict
evolutionary growth in the informal sector. Yet these programs result
in conditions characteristic of involutionary growth: a minority of
producers with the potential for growth and higher incomes and a
majority without the means to improve their business and compete for
new markets.
At first glance, the goals of AMM to include the greatest number
of Bombay's Annapurnas in the organization and to implement projects
to improve their incomes and working conditions do not seem
contradictory. But the expense involved in capitalizing producers
(with the Multi-Purpose Center and its equipment) and the uncertain
demand in new markets have forced AMM to accept the realization that
its goal s are in confl ict and that it cannot extend the benefits of
change to the majority of its members. If it continues to expand, new
members will enjoy a minimal level of benefits, including solidarity
from organization, access to social and medical services, bank loans,
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and perhaps prepared staples. Even if AMM curtails its expansion, the
majority of current members will still have access to only those
benefits. This is not to say that these projects have insignificant
impact; Chapter 2 points out in detail the important gains achieved by
Annpurnas thanks to AMM action. Rather, the point is to recognize the
limitations to the extent of AMM's success in economic areas and to
consider in this light the importance of its other, more directly
social achievements.
In its attempts to expand, AMM has sought financial support from
international agencies involved in development. Oxfam-America, the
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, the Ford Foundation and
others have provided varying amounts of assistance over the last few
years and in part made possible the construction of the Multi-Purpose
Center and the probable move to an even larger building. With
assistance come advice and negotiations about proposed activities and
the future direction of the organization. Much of this has encouraged
AMM to concentrate its efforts on current members and become more
business-like in the operation of its economic components.
According to Marty Chen of Oxfam-America, the representatives of
various funding agencies who work with AMM have suggested to Prema
Purao that the organization postpone indefinitely its plan to set up
branches in Pune and other cities.1 They feel that AMM may spread
itself to thin if it tries to accomplish all of its proposed
activities at the same time and recommend that AMM focus its energy
and resources on carrying out economic projects to assist its current
members. Though probably a wise and practical idea for the successful
survival of the organization, the donors' advice against expansion in
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favor of concentration represents the tendency toward involution, with
advantages being concentrated on a limited minority rather than on all
of a group of producers in the sector.
Viji Srinavasan of the Ford Foundation in her evaluation of a
recent AMM proposal for funding notes that the Center-based catering
operation needs to run more like a business, with standard work
shifts, and have less of an atmosphere of a social service agency. She
emphasizes the need to stress efficiency over notions of "solidarity"
and "self-confidence" if the business is to succeed. She offers the
example of too many women showing up to fill a particular order, all
anxious to "participate" though their numbers will make the process
inefficient.2  Again the observation has merit, but its implications
run counter to the philosophy of inclusion upon wich the organization
is based.
As AMM attempts business projects that go beyond its original
role of intermediary between banks and their members, Chen reports
that funding agencies have encouraged the organization to enlist the
services of people trained in business administration. They will
carry out feasibility studies and cost-benefit analyses to see whether
the vending booth and" staple distribution center projects are worth
pursuing and which products of the Center-based catering project are
the most lucrative and should be emphasized. They also will try to
determine the break-even point for the optimal number of participants
in each project. These analyses are important for the success of the
business; no one will benefit if the projects are not financial ly
viable. But limiting the scale of operations of the booths and the
catering service to an optimal size will obviously have implications
for the number of women who can particpate. And if the staple
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distribution center should prove eeconomically infeasible, AMM will
need to come up with another option for improving the work conditions
of the majority of Annapurnas, who cannot take advantage of the more
exclusive catering service and vending booth businesses.
How can we understand the tendency for AMM to mix attitudes of
solidarity and social welfare into the implementation of its income-
generation projects to such a degree as to provoke a call from its
donors to behave less like a social service agency and more like a
commercial enterprise? AMM is not alone in this confusion of goals,
and Mayra Buvinic offers several explanations of why economic
programs for women often turn into welfare action in her paper
Projects for Women in the Third World: Explaining Their Misbehavior.
In brief, in her paper Buvinic seeks to explain why most income-
generation projects for women evolve from production goals to welfare
activities during implementation. She does not try to identify
problems at the planning stages, but rather seeks to pinpoint factors
in the project environment and certain project charactertistics that
may explain the shift in focus. Of the many reasons she suggests for
the tendency of women's projects to slip from their productive
objectives to service activities, those having to do with the nature
of the implementing organization and its staff are of greatest
relevance to the case of AMM. Though these may explain in part the
behavior of AMM, the neo-Marxist analysis of the Annapurnas' role in
the economy and the signs of involutionary growth, with its limits to
economic gain, suggest additional reasons why AMM chooses to
concentrate a good deal of its resources on services which are
seemingly unrelated to business development.
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Among the elements in the project environment that the paper
identifies, the one most relevant to the case of AMM has to do with
the nature of the organization. Buvinic cites the separate
development of economic growth institutions, relief agencies, and
women's organizations after World War II and contends that most
organizations which implement women's projects developed out of the
latter two groups. She notes that the experience of these
organizations lies in welfare and community development projects and
that their staffs are ill equiped to deal with a shift to projects
promoting business. Many are generalists and lack the technical
skills necessary to run the new projects. When the new income-
generation efforts do not do well , Buvinic believes, staffs react
rationally by falling back on what they knows how to do best; they
"translate production objectives into wel fare actions." 3
Buvinic also attributes the failure of income-generation projects
to the tendency of staff, especially those who are middle-class
volunteers, to misjudge the easiness and transferability of work
believed to be stereotypically female and to encourage work that is
unprofitable in the market. She also points to the "participatory
group styles" common to many women's income-generation efforts, which
encourage women to produce collectively, as contributing to the
"wel fare slant" in the projects. 4
Buvinic characterizes the "typical" women's project as smal 1 -
scale, situation-specific, and using 1imited financial and technical
resources. It al so invol ves a lot of group participation and group
discussions to promote self-awareness and skills training. 5
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In many ways AMM does not fit this description, though some
characteristics apply. The organization's membership is huge and its
projects relatively ambitious. It serve as an intermediary between
individual Annapurnas and major sources of funding, both banks and
development agencies, and can afford to seek technical assistance.
AMM bases its existence on group participation and elected
representation. It provides an important forum for expressing the
concerns its members share and serves as a training ground where
working class women can gain experience expressing themselves in
public, a role whose importance Buvinic recognizes.
In its efforts to help members, AMM has not imposed a
stereotypical task on Annapurnas but rather has set up projects to
improve the work conditions and income from their current work. AMM's
founder was a trade union organizer for the Communist Party of India
before taking on her new role and thus probably has less of a chance
of misunderstanding the nature of productive, marketable work than
most middle-class women. The organization does not employ middle-
class volunteers, but instead steadfastly remains a working-class
organization. AMM rather pointedly makes it known that it prefers to
accept the hel p of literate, working-class men than middle-class
women. 6
Then how does Buvinic's analysis enlighten the great importance
of social benefits and group participation to the organization and the
tendency for this bent to show up in the new economic components AMM
has initiated and proposed? One possible explanation that fits within
her framework is that AMM's original rol e was as a successful
intermediary organization. It organized borrowers and pre-screened
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them for subsidized bank loans, but it has had no previous experience
in enterprise creation. In response to changing economic conditions
it has experimented with and planned diffferent ways for Annapurnas to
earn a living, but its staff may not be adequately experienced and
trained to carry out project as businesses. In response, they are
hiring business consultants to complement their own skills.
In her paper Buvinic asks, "Why is it that development projects
for poor women in the Third World assume welfare features in their
execution when they have income-generation objectives and respond to
production-oriented pol icies?" 7  I would propose two explanations,
one that has to do with AMM's concept of what constitutes
"development" and another that derives from the economic and social
context in which the members of AMM find themselves. These
explanations do not have to do with organizational weaknesses and
deficiencies, nor the nature of the projects. Rather, they reflect
the nature of the task which AMM has chosen for itself within a
certain economic context.
As I have discussed before, AMM may have difficulty running its
new economic components in a businesslike way because this requires
exclusion of most of the Annapurnas, which is anathema to AMM
philosophy. Group participation is not just a philosophical goal for
AMM; it is also the basis for many of its major accompl ishments and
its strength. The grassroots, democratic participation of members in
the organization has led to women learning to express their needs and
defend their -positions in public. AMM's huge membership and the
commonality of members' concerns constitute a relatively potent
political base and lend the organization the public exposure and
credibility it needs to deal effectively with the State. Solidarity
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among Annapurnas also has enabled them to improve their bargaining
position with their boarders. Cooperation is the basis of their
access to subsidized loans, which has reduced their vulnerability vis
a vis their suppliers and creditors both in terms of access to inputs,
price, and incidence of sexual harassment.
The services AMM offers may be considered "welfare" services, but
actually they play as important a role in reducing the Annapurnas'
vulnerability, strengthening this bargaining power, and increasing
their options as their access to loans has. Offering otherwise
inaccessible legal services and providing a temporary shelter in
particular has a value that goes beyond mere welfare activities. They
open up alternatives and provide bargaining power to women in a
context where the norm dictates that wives submit to their husbands'
and in-laws' will, be it abusive, exploitative, or unreasonable. Day-
care, medical services, and literacy classes all have economic
benefits in terms of freed-up time, time saved, and greater potential
for employment. The overall theme connecting these various components
is that they increase Annapuras' chances for achieving dignity and
independence (though not isolation). Economic gains have contributed
to the achievement of these benefits, but the experience of AMM
suggests that increased income can be a means to development rather
than its primary goal.
AMM is organized to enable women to express their needs and have
those needs be incorporated into its programs. The non-economic
components respond to problems presumably identified by members,
though there is no way to verify this. The inclusion of more social
service components in women's projects may reflect the number of
69
problems poor women face that their male counterparts do not. Women
are vulnerable to sexual harassment and physical abuse, and in most
societies they are the people primarily responsible for children's
health and well-being. It is important to plan programs that
recognize poor urban women's need to earn an adequate income and that
look beyond women's role as parents and care takers. But until women
are able to share those responsibilities with men, it would be
unresponsive to fail to recognize women's need for social services and
incorporate them into projects whenever possible.
A second explanation for AMM's heavy emphasis on "wel fare"
activities concurs with Buvinic's belief that it is a "rational"
response on the part of the organization. Carrying out non-economic
activities is rational for AMM not because the organization has had
more experience with welfare activities but because the limitations to
economic gains, which are determined by the nature of the Annapurnas'
role in the economy, make these activities significant complements to
income generation. AMM probably recognized the importance of social
services to its members before it realized the limits to increased
income its members faced. Now that AMM has recognized that those
economic components which promise the greatest changes in income and
work conditions can benefit only a fraction of its members, the
organization may value even more its ability to offer social services,
even on a limited scale.
The experience and predictions about AMM's new economic
components suggest that their ability to reach only a minority of
Annapurnas is quite possibly due to the involutionary nature of growth
in the informal sector, not just to inexperienced management or the
trials facing a new projects. If one accepts the radical analysis of
70
the role of self-employed informal sector producers in the economy and
the limitations to improving the economic situation of the majority of
them, it makes sense for organizations to pursue development
simultaneously on more than one front. The analytical framework of
neo-Marxist theory offers an explanation of environmental factors
which may influence women's organizations to shift their focus from
income-generating projects to social service efforts.
Projects based on liberal theory seem to at least stabilize the
earnings of some informal sector producers and increase their
negotiating position. Income-generation projects also provide an
activity of immediate concern around which to organize participants.
But income-generation projects seem to have a limit to their
effectiveness, so organizations that can afford it act quite
rationally when they simultaneously carry out income-generation
projects and social service delivery, because the latter to
complements meager income gains for the majority of its informal
sector members who will not benefit from a dramatic increase in
income. For the majority, social services may provide primarily non-
economic ways to decrease their vulnerability, strengthen their
bargaining power, and increase their options.
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5. Ibid., p. 5.
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CONCLUSION
The major accomplishments of the Annapurna Mahila Mandal have
involved lessening the vulnerability and broadening the opportunities
for self-determination of the home-based caterers who are its members.
It has achieved this by offering programs which stabilize their
businesses, offer opportunities for self-expression and learning, and
alter the relationships between the caterers and the people with whom
they interact on both a personal and professional basis.
AMM has enabled Annapurnas to increase their bargaining power in
their relationships with suppliers, creditors, customers, husbands,
and in-laws through a combination of efforts. Access to credit at
subsidized rates, access to legal services and a shelter for abused
women, and sol idarity among members, which is demonstrated in moral
support and collective action, all contribute to a greater degree of
self-determination and reduced vulnerability for the women.
The income-related projects of AMM have directly. addressed the
weak economic position of the Annapurnas by helping them stabilize
their businesses and offering them alternative ways to earn money in
response to changing circumstances that threaten their livelihood.
AMM also has created a forum for free expression and decision making
by consensus. This can build a base for social movements with a
broader focus that may enable the Annapurnas to enter the political
arena as an organized body to pressure the State for changes that
increase their stability in other ways.
AMM has been able to engender change on so many different fronts
because it takes a multi-faceted approach to development. But as it
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grows, the organization faces a dilemma about what kind of balance it
should establish between social issues, and goals of productivity and
economic growth. The conflict becomes particularly clear as AMM
attempts to implement more elaborate economic schemes which are
intended to effect more than basic changes in the caterers' work.
These more elaborate projects seem to be able to benefit only a
fraction of AMM members because of their greater requirements of
capital and physical space, but the organization derives much of its
effectiveness from the philosophy of inclusion and cooperation upon
which it is based. The limitations of AMM's more ambitious economic
projects raise the question of how much the organization should
concentrate on expanding its membership to offer the more basic
programs and social benefits to larger numbers of people and how much
it should attempt to change radically the work situations of a
relatively small number of members.
The struggles and successes of the Annapurna Mahila Mandal raise
several questions facing planners and organizations involved in Third
World development. The major question deals with the very definition
of development and the relative importance of social issues on the one
hand, and productivity and economic growth on the other.
AMM has had great success with its income-related projects, all
of which have had an important impact on the lives of AMM members.
But although the income-related projects have been successful, their
limitations in being able to do more than stabilize or slightly
increase the incomes of the majority of AMM members point up the
structural barriers to accumulation which place ceilings on the extent
of change that economic projects can effect for the majority of very
poor people. Planners need to acknowledge, as some major funders have
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begun to, that the upgrading of poor people's income reaches "absolute
limits"1 and that "income stabil ization or a greater predictabil ity in
the conditions of work may be the only feasible goal s" of projects. 2
The question thus arises whether development can come from a critical
mass of relatively small projects or whether efforts to bring about
deeper, structural changes are needed.
The recognition of limitations to economic improvements point to
the importance of other ways of lessening poor people's vulnerability
and increasing their opportunities for self-determination. Without
ignoring the need for a stable and adequate income that poor people,
and especially poor women, in Third World countries express, it is
important for organizations to address non-economic problems with
projects that can change relationships and the balance of power
between poor people and others. Focusing on relationships rather than
conditions of poverty takes the onus of problems off of poor people. 3
It also can help those in weaker positions become less dependent on
those who are more powerful , whether because of gender, weal th, or
caste, and shift the balance of power in relationships that
traditionally have been disadvantagious to them.
The case of AMM also raises the question of how much poor people
must rely on their own efforts and organizations to increase the
stability of their situations, for example through private insurance
schemes, heal th care services, and other mutual assistance, and how
much they can expect from the State. Usually it is relatively small
pockets of better off and better organized poor people who manage to
establish these services, which leaves the problem of how the majority
can enjoy greater stability and reduced vulnerability. That
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organizations of poor people feel the need to establish their own
services even when the government provides them (as AMM did with
health care) indicates that the government services are inadequate in
some way. The inadequacy may be due to lack of funds or the fact that
the design for their delivery does not take into consideration the
many restrictions that instability places on the users and their
ability to take advantage of the services. This seems to indicate
that at least in the short run, organizations like AMM address very
real needs of their members by providing services that are not
directly economic in nature.
Evidence from the case of the Annapurna Mahila Mandal supports a
definition of development that is neither wholly economic nor wholly
social ; it is the capacity to shape one's own destiny by reducing
one's vulnerability. People can approach this goal by carrying out a
combination of social and economic efforts which may also serve as a
base for building social movements to eventually bring about change in
the political arena.
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March 11, 1985.
3. Ray Bromley and Chris Gerry, "Where Do We Go From Here?" Casual
Work and Poverty in the Third World, ed. by Ray Bromley and Chris
Gerry, (New York: John Wiley & Sons), 1979.
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